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Editor's Note
Padraig O'Malley
Part One
This is the next to last issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy before we
usher in the new millennium. In the coming year the word itself will go through
many uses, many permutations of meaning, be subject of so much tendentious punditry,
idiotic speculation, inane commentary, and pompous prognostications that it will have
been sucked dry of meaning, and we will be left with a plethora of "millennium spe-
cials" and "the top one hundred of the millennium" in everything from cat food to hu-
man diet fads, and of course your perennial millennium "special sales" and "personali-
ties of the millennium."
And being the next to last issue of the journal in this century, it will also be a first of
its kind: a venture into the global village to ascertain how or whether we, as a species,
are improving the ways in which we govern ourselves, the lives of the six billion-plus
inhabitants of this small planet, in securing the liberty and freedom of the individual,
the primacy of law and dispensation of justice, the enhancing of human potential, the
provision of work for the able, the construction of the groundwork for a better life for
all — dignity and respect, freedom from hunger, tolerance, adequate shelter, elimina-
tion of illiteracy, proliferation of the new literacy, ending dictatorial and authoritarian
rule, promoting the inviolability of human rights, stemming the flow of hundreds of
millions of refugees who live in little more than badly upgraded concentration camps,
countryless and uncared for except for the unstinting efforts of underappreciated and
underfunded nongovernmental organizations and the like, and improving the health and
sanitary conditions in which three-quarters of the world is mired in cycles of disease
and poverty, in making some headway in closing the gap between the rich and the poor.
All of which, in this strange new world of ours, will have an impact on the way we
live in New England.
In the past twenty years, we have been suffused with words and phrases like global-
ization, democratization, free and fair elections, emerging markets, participatory de-
mocracy, consensual decision-making, and a proliferation of other catchphrases that
suggest improvement in governance systems both within countries and between coun-
tries, yet the improvement more often remains in the promise, not in the reality.
In particular, in this issue we will look at the experiences of countries that have un-
dergone or are trying to undergo the transition to democracy from either totalitarian or
authoritarian regimes, or some dictatorial point in between to what we call free-market
economies with all the accouterments of democracy. I use the word accouterments
deliberately, since what constitutes the "accouterments" necessary for democracy has
come under increasing scrutiny as societies, once the scourge of civil libertarians and
advocates of human rights, try to abandon old ways and become members in good
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standing in the new global order. Notions of what constitutes national sovereignty are
more problematic than ever, and one person, one vote does not necessarily a democracy
make.
Even in this limited regard there is a wry irony. The century began with Herbert
Asquith, leader of the Liberal Party in Britain, campaigning successfully for the aboli-
tion of the veto powers of the House of Lords. (At the time, legislation could be passed
by the House of Commons, whose members were elected by the people, but it could be
vetoed by the House of Lords, composed for the most part of hereditary peers. The
century ends with Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair introducing legislation to abolish
whatever residual voting powers, mostly delaying powers, hereditary peers have.) Were
an African country to vest such powers in, say, traditional chiefs for the better part of a
century, it would be pilloried by the fastidious custodians of democracy, themselves
often paragons of moral rot and obsequious decay, for its dereliction in adhering to
"proper" democratic norms. In politics, no matter how wide one cuts the swath, what's
good for the goose is not necessarily good for the gander.
Nor, of course, can notions of democratic governance be divorced from notions of
economic empowerment of the masses and sustainable development in poor countries,
which constitute the greater number of the countries under study in this issue. For years,
they have been instructed by the mandarins in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank how to run their affairs. Maintain a stable currency to attract for-
eign exchange. Keep inflation low. To attract foreign exchange flows, especially in the
form of fixed inward investment to stimulate growth, cut government expenditure and
reduce the ratio of the budget deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) to some arbi-
trarily chosen figure, which means that when the technical jargon is decoded those
countries are left with social safety nets full of holes. In short, get the government out
of the way and the market in all its glorious manifestations will allocate resources effi-
ciently and productively and for the benefit of all.
If matters start to go a little awry, either through circumstances beyond their control,
or failure to hold government expenditure in check, or to strike a balance between mon-
etary and fiscal policy, or widespread inefficiency, lack of capacity or bountiful corrup-
tion, they are "encouraged" to jack up interest rates to maintain the stream of capital
inflows necessary to keep the foreign exchange rates pegged at their current levels.
Exorbitant interest rates, unfortunately, choke off economic growth, leaving borrowing
countries damned if they do and damned if they don't. Naughty countries get slapped
with structural adjustment programs that punish the wicked and leave them even more
indebted to their would-be benefactors. (This regimen of deficit cutting and anti-infla-
tionary measures that have been the hallmark of IMF structural adjustment programs
since the 1980s is called, for want of better nomenclature, "the Washington consensus.")
Jeffrey Sachs put the matter very succinctly.
The IMF bought into the investment bankers' mantra: exchange rate stability above
all else. If central bankers devote their reserves to a defence of the exchange rate,
and if the IMF dedicates its funds to a defence of the central banks, lending to
emerging markets is like shooting fish in a barrel. Or so it seemed — until a stam-
pede began in the other direction.
The IMF encouraged central banks from Jakarta to Moscow to Brasilia to raise
interest rates to catastrophic levels to protect their currencies, lest they lose the
confidence of the money managers. Of course, the money managers could see one
step beyond the IMF: investors do not gain confidence when short term rates are
pushed to dozens of per cent, as they have been in Russia, South Korea, South
Africa, and Brazil at some points this year. Yet the more these countries tried to
defend their currencies, the more they incited panic. 1
One model — the prize exhibit, so to speak — of how a developing democracy should
run its affairs — the Asian model with its Thailands and South Koreas and Indonesias
— the pride and joy of the international supra-sovereign financial institutions — has,
alas, collapsed.
The implications for these countries in terms of the regulatory reform they will have
to make in their financial service institutions, are as important, if not more important,
than the structural reforms they will have to make in their governance practices if they
are to weather the ruin that rained down on their economies in the last eighteen months.
Or perhaps there will be a growing realization that structural reform in the public and
private sectors are intertwined, that regulation and transparency are necessary to both,
that there is a symmetrical relation between the two. They are quintessential sides of
the same coin. You can't flip just one side of the coin and leave the other in the palm of
your hand.
Some years ago, Francis Fukuyama argued in The End of History and the Last Man 2
that with the collapse of communism and the triumph of capitalism, the battle for
"ideas" was over, and that in that sense we had arrived at the cul-de-sac of history itself
— a millennium of peace and prosperity was at hand with the emergence of pan-global
liberal capitalistic democracy. 3 The fact that such a preposterous hypothesis could be
taken seriously, never mind being the subject of countless conferences, seminars, work-
shops, and reams of befuddling gibberish, is perhaps as good an indicator as any that
the more outrageous the thought the more seriously it is taken, and that the predica-
ments we now face in world markets are as much a result of our consummate hubris as
the unpredictability of the future.
Until recently, the collective wisdom assured us that free-market capitalism plus a
decent dollop of democracy had finally routed all other forms of economic and political
organization. But with the Asian economies somersaulting from boom to bust, and the
financial equivalent of AIDS — appropriately named "contagion" — infecting one
economy after another, inducing the collapse of financial markets in dominolike fashion
as the system imploded under the weight of its inherent contradictions, the triumph of
free-market capitalism has been called into question. Does the emperor ever have
clothes? History, it seems, has not quite finished with itself— or us.
Traditional remedies have proved ineffective, leading one of the world's more emi-
nent advocates of free markets, Paul Krugman, to publicly address the vexed question
of the emperor's clothes. 4 Should we, he asks, given the seriousness of the current crisis,
not temporarily "scupper" reliance on the market. 5 Traditional economic nostrums sim-
ply haven't worked, he argues. If an afflicted country raises interest rates and taxes to
protect its currency, economic growth comes to a grinding halt, and even fundamentally
sound companies are brought to ruin. If instead a country caught in the vortex of a
downward spiral keeps interest rates low and lets its currency collapse, it will trigger
capital flight and inflation. What Krugman suggests is heresy to free-marketeers: "[The
only way out] is a solution so stigmatized," he writes, not with the conviction of a
convert but with the resigned doggedness of one who must follow his own conclusions
to their logical end, "that hardly anyone has dared suggest it."6 The unsayable words are
"exchange controls." 7
Globalization and the onward march of the free market, guided by the mysterious.
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even divine wisdom of the Invisible Hand, have made nation-states virtually irrelevant;
we queue up to apply for our visas to enter this new global village, where the pastures
are greener, the land more fertile, and there is room for all to flourish. All this is, as
events of the last year so vividly illustrate, an extension of the end-of-history hype,
erroneous in the extreme, even subversive in the sense that rather than proving to be an
instrument that would reduce disparities in income and wealth distributions between
nations, it has proved itself an adept instrument for the opposite.
Many of the assumptions underlying democratization that were articles of faith in the
mid-eighties and early nineties would be regarded, and rightly so, as sheer hogwash in
the era of the global marketplace and instantaneous capital flows. Others, still part of
the received orthodoxy, require a thorough reexamination. Emerging democracies, espe-
cially those in Africa, and more especially those in sub-Sahara Africa, devastated by
war, famine, disease, and without even the pretense of a tarred road, to say nothing of
an infrastructure, or parts of Asia and Latin America with low incomes and no savings,
have little or no control over their economic fate in a free-for-all market system. They
are the procession of ghosts that follow their funeral corteges, the sad echoes of their
hollow frames a dirge to the victims of travails beyond their own making.
II
Last September, much of the world waited with apprehensive anticipation to see how
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Bank, would act to deal
with the global financial crisis threatening to plunge the world into recession. It may as
well have waited for Godot. Which in itself is a sufficient commentary on who is the
ultimate arbiter of what's good for the world, never mind individual countries, of who
should suffer the "pains and arrows of outrageous fortune," the consequences of the
fallout of decisions made by rapacious speculators, opportunistic financial institutions,
and countries that have become old hands at manipulating the IMF and its ilk. Borrow-
ing heavily puts the onus for repayment not on the borrower but on the lender. The
threat of large-scale default with the "contagion" it spreads, is the best weapon borrow-
ers have for further assistance to preclude economic meltdown, a form of blackmail in
which the continued viability of an interdependent world economy makes the strong
beholden to the weak.
But blackmail, insidious creature that it is, has a penchant for enmeshing black-
mailer as well as blackmailed in its greedy claws.
HI
There is an increasingly invoked view that an IMF bailout does little for the poor and
the underclass in a stricken country, but is of most assistance to the First World creditor
banks and currency speculators whose self-serving actions are often responsible for the
country's dire predicament in the first place. As long as First World banks and investors
can count on an IMF bailout to countries that go into an economic free fall, they have a
safety chute that enables them to make risky loans and investments without having to
worry about the consequences of their financial transactions going wrong, and the
countries that can rely on the IMF as the lender of last resort have little incentive to
reform their often crony-oriented banking systems and address the corruption that cor-
rodes their economies.
The IMF itself has come under increasing scrutiny since 1998. In the year since the
start of the Asian crisis in September 1997, the IMF disbursed SI 20 billion in interna-
tional bailouts. One year later, all the countries it had attempted to rescue from the
financial holes they had dug themselves into with such careless abandon were in worse
shape. IMF prescriptions, or other IMF conditions for loans, had only exacerbated the
economic woes of the countries in question. Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and Russia,
rather than being out of intensive care, were still struggling to survive on IMF respira-
tors that were themselves experiencing severe power outages. After its massive dis-
bursement of funds, the IMF had less than $10 billion on hand to contain future contin-
gencies and found itself going, cap in hand, to tap a line of credit to the tune of S24
billion from the ultimate lender of last resort, a faceless entity operating under the suit-
ably anonymous cover of the General Arrangement to Borrow.
In terms of policy, the organization, once the oracle before which poor countries
humbled themselves in trepidation, is becoming the focus for severe criticism. To pre-
scribe for any one country tight monetary policy which leads to higher interest rates,
cuts in government expenditure, and a reduction in consumer demand might be the
correct "treatment" for the ailing patient; but when every patient swallows the same
economic medicine at the same time, the result is a collective overdose: Jonestown-like
deflation. Unless an antidote is quickly found for resuscitation a worldwide slowdown
will further harden the global economy's arteries and recession will litter the landscape
with dead economies.
Economies asphyxiating on the last whiffs of financial oxygen are clutching desper-
ately at the empty canisters. One feature of the global economy in the final year of a
century not particularly distinguished for its regard for human life, is that technology
has in fact made human labor replaceable as a factor of production in ever increasing
areas of economic activity, and most tyrannically in emerging markets or those for
which the word emerging is an aspiration well beyond their reach. One-third of the
eligible workforce in the world is either unemployed or underemployed, that is, there
are at least one billion people across the globe who cannot provide the wherewithal for
their own survival or the survival of their families. 8 Nor will they ever be in a position
to do so. Economic growth is increasingly of the non-job creating kind. The problem
the world faces as it straddles the cusp of the twenty-first century is what to do with
people.
"For its swiftness and confounding of experts, the evaporation of the Asian 'eco-
nomic miracle' probably ranks only second to the unraveling of soviet socialism as the
greatest surprise of the last half century," says Walden Berro, a member of the Social
Research Institute at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. 9 And with the evaporation
of the miracle some of the world's most cherished shibboleths regarding the building
blocks for economic growth and the consolidation of democratic governance crumbled
as the foundations upon which they were constructed collapsed in the financial mud
slide that swept away everything in its accelerating path.
What should have been of most immediate concern is why the international financial
institutions — the IMF and the World Bank in particular, institutions which had guided
and in some cases been the prime movers in the remarkable transformation of these
economies — could have been so uncomprehending of what was happening around
them, so inept in their forecasting, so blind to the fault lines at the economic seams of
these countries, so impercipient of the financial practices that flourished under their
very noses, and yet so dogmatically sure of themselves when it came to prescribing the
"adjustments" countries the world over, especially the poorer ones, would have to put
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into practice before they could receive the aid vital to keeping open their lifelines to
the rest of the global economy, could have gotten it so wrong, that the collapses across
Asia, which send one-quarter of the global economy into recession, found them flat-
footed, bewildered, and at a loss to give a reason for it all, until, of course, they discov-
ered in hindsight that the symptoms of imminent disintegration were there all the time,
only we were too busy applauding success to see the rotten apple at the core.
We were treated to the wise words of the senior IMF official who told the Royal
Academy of Morocco that Indonesia was within reach of eliminating poverty. Four
months later the World Bank's Indonesia specialist was predicting that up to one in four
Indonesians, or some 50 million people, might lose their jobs in a catastrophic eco-
nomic meltdown. 10
Or more incomprehensible still: the IMF, in its 1997 annual report, wrote that "direc-
tors welcomed Korea's continued macroeconomic performance [and] praised the au-
thorities for [its] enviable fiscal record." 11 Three months later, the Korean government
was negotiating with the same IMF for a $57 billion bailout to prevent the world's elev-
enth largest economy from going down the global drain.
Or who was held to account in the IMF, that most circumspect of organizations for
the most noncircumspect report that "in [Southeast Asia], the region is poised to extend
its success into the twenty-first century and governments still have a major role in driv-
ing this process"? This confidence was rooted in "the region's strong macroeconomic
principles, in [Southeast Asia's] tradition of, and commitment to, efficient allocation of
investment, and in the widespread belief that the external environment would continue
to be supportive." 12 Less than a year later, the IMF decried Asia's "fundamentals" as
severely wanting. The crisis, it argued, was "mostly home-grown."
The "Asian Tigers," the IMF's models of probity, before their ignominious implo-
sions, for all emerging markets, were now harshly condemned for the laxity of their
banking systems, and a new phrase, "crony capitalism," was coined to describe their
disgrace. The tigers were quarantined, confined to their cages before the contagion
could spread. But the damage was done; the red meat of their financial entrails poi-
soned, and the contagion spread: hence the fear and loathing in other emerging markets.
Some analysts sought more profound meanings:
After all [they expostulated], capitalism is supposed to excel at allocating invest-
ment funds efficiently. In this case, it didn't. The deeper explanation is that market
capitalism is not just an economic system. It is also a set of cultural values that
emphasizes the virtue of competition, the legitimacy of profit, and the value offree-
dom. These values are not universally shared. Other countries have organized
economic systems around different values and politics.
As a result, spreading capitalism is not simply an exercise in economic engi-
neering. It is an assault on other nations ' culture and politics that almost guaran-
tees a collision.. Even when some countries adopt some of the trappings of capital-
ism, they do not embrace the basic values that make the system work. This is what
happened. Led by the U.S., global agencies (the World Trade Organization, the
International Monetary Fund) sought to persuade poorer countries to become more
open to trade and global capital. These countries tried to maximise the benefits of
the process while minimizing changes to their politics and commerce. [My italics]
Thus:
Mutual deception flourished. Countries like Korea and Russia pretended that they
had. American, European, and Japanese bankers, executives, and government
8
officials pretended the claims were true — or might become true. Loans were made
on the basis of incomplete or faulty statements. Or they were made on the faith that,
if a loan went sour, someone (the government, the IMF) would cover the losses.n
And thus:
Global capitalism has become a dangerous hybrid. On the one hand, investors com-
mitted huge sums and expected high returns. On the other, the money often went —
through bank loans, bond issues, and stock offerings — to borrowers who were not
operating according to the strict rules of efficiency or profit and loss. Crony capital-
ism often meant corruption: contracts won with bribes; favoritism for the well-
connected. In 1997, a group called Transparency International ranked corruption in
fifty-two countries as judged by global executives and country specialists. Not
surprisingly, Russia ranked fourth, Indonesia seventh, and Thailand fourteenth.
But capital flowed freely, and self-deception prevailed. Banks collected interest
on loans. "Emerging market" mutual funds rose, because local stocks were buoyed
by new investment money. While everyone enjoyed profits, there was a suspension
of belief. Now comes the reckoning. Capital flight has forced most developing
countries to conserve scarce foreign exchange.
Countries cannot expand their economies unless they replenish their foreign
exchange reserves of hard currencies. 14
Not much mention is made here of the fact that every time the IMF bails out one
more emerging market economy that has hit the economic dust, it is using the tax dol-
lars of the developed world, not to bail out the countries in distress but the commercial
financial institutions in the developed countries that made the questionable loans in the
first place. Thus, the commercial loans of financial institutions in the First World to
emerging markets are virtually risk-free, since if things go sour, they can count on the
IMF to step in and more or less secure their "bad" loans, while the cost of the defective
and unwise decisions of these supposedly free-market institutions are channeled via
taxpayers in the wealthy countries through the IMF onto the backs of the miserable
millions in the poor countries, once the beneficiaries of Western financial largess, who
have to shoulder the burden of the stringent repayment conditions the IMF attaches to
making the bailout loans. Something is wrong here — not merely wrong but, if one
were conspiratorially inclined, deviously wrong. The poor ultimately pay for the mis-
takes of the rich.
rv
Some of the variables that had yet to make their full weight felt.
First, whether the turnabout in the fortunes of the yen assumes a critical mass that
conveys a permanence. A stronger yen is the precise antidote for Asia's malaise, for
unless Pacific Rim exports become more competitive, thus taking the pressure off
China to devalue and boosting the buying power of Japanese consumers, recovery of
any substantial extent will remain problematical.
Second, the reform of Japan's banking system must be seen to be getting off to a
real start. Japan's government has committed itself to injecting $600 billion into the
banking system, a sum that is equal to almost all of Japan's bad loans. But many are
dubious, and if past practices are anything to go by, the well-chronicled pattern of false
starts feeds skepticism.
However, the known but unacknowledged and unspoken fact is that Japan's banks are
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bankrupt, with bad loans and defaults amounting to one trillion dollars - an amount
equal to roughly 25 percent of gross national product (GNP). (For a comparative yard-
stick use the Savings and Loans crash in the late 1980s in the United States.) The bail-
out, huge though it was, amounted to 2 per cent of GNP. If the Japanese government
were to "refinance" the banking system, it would drive the country into a possible de-
pression, and as goes Japan, so goes the rest of Asia.
The impact of the world's second largest economy going belly-up, followed by per-
vasive depression throughout Asia, which accounts for one-third of the world's output,
would, at the least, induce recession in the United States, and most probably in the rest
of the world. If Japan were to try to deal with its banking crisis by calling in loans due
from the United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the world — it is in the ironic
position of having a banking system that is functional only in name while being the
world's largest creditor nation — banks all over the world would teeter and fall as they
would be unable to cover their repayments, thus triggering a worldwide recession,
which in the long-run would do little to help Japan. 15
Third, after the IMF and twenty of the world's richest countries reluctantly (the fact
that they did so reluctantly was a harbinger of eventual failure) agreed to finance a
$41.5 billion loan package for Brazil in return for massive austerity cuts on the parts of
the Brazilians (Brazil's foreign reserves had fallen from $75 billion to $43 billion be-
tween August and November 1998), the deal did not close the financial dikes, and two
months after the bailout was put together, Brazil's currency, the real, was effectively
devalued by 8 percent: the repercussions will be felt throughout the Americas, including
Mexico, Venezuela, Chile; indeed, in all countries with weak current account balances.
And the repercussions will be felt in the United States. The question again is whether
the consequences will "merely" envelop most of the Americas in a recession or whether
an impending financial implosion might trigger an economic meltdown. One way or
another, the question will lure speculators, once again emerging from their safe havens.
Fourth, the most watched, and befittingly the least open to scrutiny: What will hap-
pen in China? Despite its continued insistence that it would meet the targeted growth
rate of 8 percent for both 1998 and 1999 and that devaluation of the yuan, which would
trigger a new financial panic in East Asia, is out of the question, all indicators point to a
severe economic slowdown. A growth rate of even 4 percent this year or next would, in
China's circumstances, amount to a recession, given that every percentage point drop in
GDP means 5 million more unemployed, that some reliable estimates already predict
18 to 20 million unemployed within a year, a recipe for political unrest. 16 In addition,
there are signs that China's financial institutions are becoming a little unstuck. China's
banks are burdened with bad debts, both to state enterprises and to property speculators,
made during the boom days of the early 1990s. Many state enterprises are themselves
bankrupt and face closure, unpalatable though that course of action is to the Chinese. 17
A devaluation of the Chinese yuan or the Hong Kong dollar would devastate Asian
markets, crushing their efforts to pick themselves up following the East Asian debacle,
send the usual "shock waves" through the developed world, harden predictions of a
global recession to the point where the near certainty attached to the predictions create
situations in which the predictions become inevitable certainties, and lead to a global
crisis of liquidity. In these circumstances, or even less consequential ones, as the bite of
economic slowdown begins to clench its teeth on the West's economies, developed
countries will do what is best for themselves — the resuscitation of foreign markets to
absorb their exports and cushion unemployment will be the first order of business, and
10
hence an even more ambitious emphasis on pulling Asia, in particular, and the more
important emerging markets in the Americas out of their quagmires.
In the face of overwhelming poverty, exacerbated by AIDS, the devastation of endemic
wars, dysfunctional education, the virtual nonexistence of electricity, sanitation, and
clean water, rudimentary and unhygienic health care, recurrent famine, Africa owes
some $227 billion to international creditors, which amounts to about $600 for each
person on the continent. Of the forty-one most heavily indebted low-income countries
in the world, no fewer than thirty-four are in sub-Sahara Africa.
In 1996, the World Bank and the IMF announced a plan to reduce the debt burdens
of the world's poorest countries. Two years later, a confidential report to the World
Bank's executive board said that "considerable progress had been made." 18 One shud-
ders to think what the World Bank might construe as lack of progress. Some forty coun-
tries, again mostly in Africa, were sufficiently poor and indebted to qualify for assis-
tance under the 1996 debt-relief plan. Of those, ten have had their cases reviewed, and
six, three of which were African — Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, and Mozambique —
have been promised help.
Only one, Uganda, has had any debt forgiven. And only a handful more will qualify
for aid before the end of the century, despite the bank's having agreed to relax its re-
strictions at the September 8 meeting to enable countries which had put economic re-
form programs in place by 2000 to become eligible for assistance, thus opening the
door for war-torn countries such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and
Sudan. However, even with the relaxed restrictions in place, and assuming that all debt-
relief conditions are met — a big assumption, only a handful of countries will receive
any relief by the end of the century. 19
One reason is that debt relief raises the cost to creditor governments, and about half
is owed to rich-country governments which also pick up much of the outstanding debts
of multilateral institutions that lack the resources to do so themselves. The cost to credi-
tor countries would become much greater if the pool of countries eligible for benefits is
further increased.
Moreover, with large and economically important areas slowly succumbing to the
impact of the global financial crisis, the effects of which may take two years to work its
way through the global market, developed countries have become more circumspect.
Adding to the caution and uncertainty is the huge cost of financing the bailout of Brazil,
the increasing uncertainty regarding Brazil's capacity to meet its obligations under the
bailout, continuing economic and political instability, which can only worsen, and the
looming crisis in China.
Unfortunately, the less developed emerging markets or the undeveloped markets of
the rest of the world, the world of the chronically poor and for the most part forgotten,
will not be part of recovery programs, because not having had much to begin with, there
is little to recover, and there is no comparison between the short-term return on one
billion dollars spent on debt relief or one billion dollars spent in bailing out the markets
that count.
This leaves South Africa, for example, in a no-man's-land. An emerging market, yes,
but one that has not lived up to its potential and shows little signs of doing so, espe-
cially as it has to contend with recession in an election year in which the election
11
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results will be more pivotal than the elections in 1994 since they will point to the direc-
tion of South Africa's future well into the twenty-first century. But also an emerging
market surrounded by some of the poorest countries in the world, hostage to the uncer-
tain, or in a number of cases, the absence of a future in many, to the endemic strife that
the continent seems unable to stem, and with a culture of corruption that has led many
donor countries to abandon their efforts to help when the only real tangible results of
relief is the enrichment of elites and the further impoverishment of the masses.
In How Africa Was Brought Low, an essay for the African Renaissance Conference,
Dr. Peter Ewang writes:
Bilateral and multilateral organizations have made certain policy interventions as a
direct precondition for loan effectiveness. However, these activities ignore the fact
that in African countries the constraints for development are not caused solely by
economic factors but by institutional weakness, low-level social awareness, educa-
tion, and health care.
Most of the time the constraints have been ignored. Nowadays decisions are
dominated by or influenced by international organizations with very limited techni-
cal and socio-cultural expertise and insight concerning African countries. Develop-
ment is something that means something distinctly different to those being devel-
oped and those doing the developing. The economic structure of African countries
has been developed not to feed their own people but to meet the import needs of
development that have made Africa a site of recurring famine, unpayable debts, and
in need of a renaissance.
There is ample evidence that international development programmes have failed
in most of the African countries. Since 1980 Africa has received billions of dollars
as aid through development programmes, yet Africa today produces less food and
has more hungry people. It is no coincidence that over the past decades, some of the
largest recipients of the USA and the former Soviet Union's aid in Sub-Sahara
Africa, particularly Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Angola, have been
nations where war, famine, and hunger are most common.
At best the aid programmes of the past were not effective, at worst they have
been part of the problem. Development has often helped destroy people's ability to
feed themselves. Offers of food pour in but obtaining financial resources for reha-
bilitation is usually difficult. Dumping food as relief has not solved the develop-
mental problems of Africa. Food aid extended by developed countries, following
devastating famines caused by civil strife and natural calamities, has adversely
affected the capacity of the continent to deal with its problems. Generally food aid
programmes have introduced a harmful spirit of submissiveness and dependency
into these poor societies and inefficiency and corruption into governments of most
of these countries.
The hunger and debt caused by the huge debts are difficult to accept. Govern-
ments in Sub-Sahara Africa have been pressured by the IMF and the World Bank
into implementing structural adjustment programmes in order to acquire loans for
development. These countries are made to pay their debts by surrendering the bulk
of their export earnings, leasing out valuable resources at throwaway prices to earn
extra income, and sacrificing social and environmental considerations to earn
enough to pay their debts.
Many countries in Sub-Sahara Africa owe more money today than they did ten
or twenty years ago. In fact, in 1992 African external debt had reached $290 billion,
about 2.4 times greater than in 1980. In the Sub-Saharan African countries alone the
debt increased from $6 billion in 1970 to $243 billion in 1994. The big question is
why the big institutions (the World Bank, IMF, and others) let this unbearable debt
accrue.
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That such an essay should be one of the showcase features introducing the confer-
ence is cause for reflection. The insinuation is that developed countries not only plun-
dered Africa in the past but continue to do so in the guise of development programs,
which although ostensibly tailored to the needs of the country in question are in effect
instruments of measured interference, designed to service the needs of the developed
countries. Even humanitarian aid — food to alleviate famine — is viewed in a sinister
light. For every dollar given in aid, there is a condition, an unspoken agenda to mold
the economies of the poorer countries according to the dictates and, needless to say,
advantage of the donor country.
The essay is an expression of anger at developed countries: at their hubris, their "we-
know-it-all" attitude; their condescension inherited from the lingering sense of conquest
and the unstated but silently held conviction that things were better in "their" day. In-
deed, even today, and perhaps to a greater degree in the post-Cold War era, former
colonial powers vie with one another for "parental" control over what used to be "their"
Africa, and when the children are naughty, they are not above sending in their troops to
sort things out, all under the pretense of having to "protect" their citizens who are still
residents of whatever godforsaken piece of earth is being scorched in the interests of
some tin-pot dictator or the would-be usurper of his much coveted position. It is a mani-
festation of deep resentment of the developed countries' self-perceived sense of going
out of the way to help, at the altruism they smother themselves in, when the help really
only makes recipients more roiled that they have to turn to their former "masters" or
clones of their erstwhile masters for help in the first place; bitterness that the help en-
courages a culture of helplessness, thus fostering the dependency the help is supposed
to eradicate.
It is noteworthy, too, for what it fails to say. That every other country in large swaths
of the continent is embroiled in civil conflict or party to the civil conflicts of others;
that famine is often self-induced; that food relief is used as a weapon to leverage con-
cessions from the enemy; that food is often withheld from the starving and mysteriously
finds its way into the hands of the warmongers; that corruption is pervasive.
Given that many of Africa's conflicts have their roots in borders arbitrarily drawn by
conquering powers with little regard to natural alignments, ethnic demarcations, or
history, and that fears of domination by one ethnic group, often justified, are never far
from the surface, that natural disasters have taken an inordinate toll, that the 12 million
refugees who are permanently homeless — and countryless — have nowhere to go and
create a permanent source of instability in the region, and that indebtedness cripples the
prospects for development, one can easily empathize with the rage of Africa.
But the failure of Ewang to acknowledge that Africans may have anything to do with
the plight they are in, that the actions of their elites or of those who stoked ethnic an-
tagonisms and fanned the flames of hatred for personal ambition, of those who looted
their countries of their wealth on a scale almost unimaginable to imagine, who have
exploited their own people to a degree that not even the colonial imperialists of the past
could match, to fail to hold Africa accountable for many of the ills that beset it is to
sink into the self-pity that is the hallmark of the submissiveness and dependency he
goes to such great lengths to warn against.
Commenting on the renaissance conference, Thabo Kobokoane observed that "the
conflicts plaguing Africa did not dominate the proceedings." (In the past year, one of
four countries in Africa was engaged in conflict; half the worldwide deaths occurred in
Africa.)
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Surely discussion on these wars and rebellions should have been at the centre of any
debate about a reawakening Africa? After all, it is the continent's all-too-familiar
problems that fly in the face of a so-called renaissance; a massive stumbling block
to those who will eventually oversee its regeneration.
Yet to the bulk of African Renaissance delegates, the festering conflicts did not
appear important. [An equally] pressing question that needed addressing concerned
the nature of Africa's governments. How will the African renaissance "movement,"
an essentially private-driven initiative, relate to those states that have no tolerance
of civil society?21
VI
The Gini coefficient is the standard tool for measuring the degree of inequality in a
society. On a scale of to 1 , where represents absolute equality and 1 absolute in-
equality, South Africa currently ranks second in the world in terms of income inequality
with a coefficient of 0.58; only Brazil, with a coefficient of 0.63, ranks worse. Accord-
ing to one argument, countries in the throes of development should undergo an increase
in levels of income inequality, since growth by its very nature is an uneven process, and
hence the inequities to which it gives rise are a function of growth itself— a dynamic
process in which the variables that drive it are themselves changing at differential rates
— important components of growth such as the movement of labor from less productive
sectors of the economy to the more productive, patterns of migration from rural areas to
urban areas, the distribution of capital with a preponderance going to capital-intensive
industries, the unequal rates of technological change, the gestation of "new" industries,
all ensure that inequalities increase as society is in a perpetual state of transformation.
It is not unsurprising therefore that Gini coefficients tend to be highest in the emerg-
ing economies — Chile (0.56), Panama (0.57), Thailand (0.46), Malaysia (0.56), and
closer to South Africa, Zimbabwe (0.57) and Kenya (0.58). On the other end of the
scale, countries with the highest degrees of inequality tend to be the poorest countries,
trapped in unbreakable chains of pervasive poverty — Bangladesh (0.28), Rwanda
(0.29), and Laos (0.30). 22 The capitalist view: "inequality, despite its perceived inequity,
is nothing more than growth in progress." 23 Which would appear to suggest that the
greater the degree of inequality, the more growth in progress, and that if we value
growth, we should be prepared to tolerate the inequalities it breeds.
The transfer of technology may also increase inequality. Although some innovations
benefit the worst off, much technological progress raises the marginal products of those
who are already more productive. Even when it does not, the opportunity cost of public
investment in technology might be forgone investment in antipoverty programs. By
increasing output, however, these investments can benefit the entire society. The poten-
tial trickle down, however, is not necessarily rapid or comprehensive. 24
VII
If the white view of inequality is that white affluence relative to blacks is not attribut-
able to white exploitation of blacks, which has contributed to the relative and absolute
poverty of blacks, then South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki's argument that
there are two nations in South Africa — one white and well off, the other black and
poor— is lost on whites and one more instance of the refusal on the part of whites to
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acknowledge the damage that apartheid did, especially in confining the education of
blacks to a level that ensured that they could not rise above a certain functional level —
of serving as the human fuel for the white industrial machines and as the underground
excavators of the mineral wealth that enriched the white fraternity. If whites cannot
bring themselves to see — and acknowledge — that they exploited blacks in the past,
and especially under apartheid, then the future for improved race relations is bleak, and
an increasingly resentful black elite will seek retribution through the means whites fear
most — redistribution through taxation. How can one speak of nation building when the
people who are supposedly the rudimentary core of the nation engage each other with
such silent enmity?
VIII
In the United States, unchallenged in its role as the global economy's financial police-
man, Alan Greenspan's decisions reflect U.S. interests, in this case how best to balance
the country's vulnerability to deflation in markets that are of most concern to it, that are
destinations for its exports against the risks of inflation at home which would result
from increasing the money supply, thereby triggering a reduction in interest rates. It
was universally agreed — as if universal agreement on anything counts for much in a
world in which the capacity to produce instantaneous information on any issue at any
point far outweighs the capacity of its recipients to assimilate it — that the concomitant
domino effects which would follow a cut in interests rates in the United States would
save many countries from free fall into recession.
What kind of New World Order are we building when the economic fate of the strug-
gling countries that account for the overwhelming proportion of the world's population
lies in the hands of a reserve bank that makes its decisions on rates reduction on the
basis of what's best for the United States, not on the basis of what is best for the world
economy, on the basis of how deflation in many parts of the world would impinge on
American interests and open the economy to possible exposure to the deflation virus, on
the basis of what's good for America is good for the rest of the world, an indicator of
the hubris of a country which has had to suffer the least, and whose response to address-
ing the increasing disparities in world inequities is to cut the relatively small percentage
of GDP it contributes in aid to distressed nations struggling to emerge from centuries of
oppression and exploitation. (It already contributes the least — at 0. 1 1 percent of GDP.
it ranks at the bottom of the list compared with what other developed and the upper tier
of developing countries contribute, and it has steadfastly refused to pay its arrears to the
United Nations.)25
To talk of the need to build multiparty democracies in such circumstances or to go
on millimeter-measuring exercises to determine whether a country is slipping from
being a one-party dominant state to a one-party state would be farcical were they not so
pervasively practiced by the savants of the United States' perceived national interest.
(Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who refers to America's
allies and friends as "vassals and tributaries," argues the case for a grand geostrategy
that would "prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals,
keep the tributaries pliant and protected, and keep the barbarians from coming to-
gether."26 And David Rothkopf, a former senior member of the Clinton administration,
in a burst of moral fervor and patriotic humility was moved to write that "Americans
should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the world, theirs is the most just and
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the best model for the future."27 The proposition that we have reached the end of history
still has its adherents; history, it seems, is somehow synonymous with the American
destiny.)
Indeed, when Greenspan made the "by-the-way" acknowledgment before the U.S.
Senate on September 22, 1998, that Reserve Bank policymakers were fully aware of the
widening financial crisis that had spread from Asia to the rest of the world and its im-
pact on the U.S. economy ("Deteriorating foreign economies and their spillover to do-
mestic markets have increased the possibility that the slowdown in the growth of the
American economy will be more than sufficient to hold inflation in check"),28 financial
analysts profoundly proclaimed that this was the clearest indication yet that Greenspan
would fight the prospect of a spreading recession by lowering U.S. interest rates. Asian
markets soared, and some of the capital that had fled some of the more sophisticated
emerging markets in search of safer or more lucrative rewards returned to local bourses.
In South Africa, the rand recovered to close the day's trading at R5.8 to the dollar—
the "symbolic" R6.00 to the dollar benchmark had been breached, and in the euphoria
that followed many market analysts predicted a quick recovery, overlooking the fact
that not too long ago an exchange rate of R5.00 to the dollar was cause for the market
to develop a severe case of the jitters.
In the event, when Greenspan did make his "momentous" decision, he cut the Re-
serve Bank's prime rate 0.25 percent, well below anticipation and already well dis-
counted in the markets. The result: "An immense cloud of despondency hung over local
markets as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange all share index took a further 3.337 per-
cent tumble . . . and the rand once again slid relentlessly against the dollar, breaking
through the R6 barrier."29 So much for euphoria and its afterglow.
What annoyed, frustrated, indeed angered other countries, especially the emerging
markets, was Greenspan's seeming myopia or indifference, or worse, ignorance regard-
ing what was happening in the world around him.
Greenspan's second intervention in the market in October, when he unexpectedly cut
short-term interest rates by another quarter of a percent, the second such cut in the
space of sixteen days, had at least the salutary benefit of being unanticipated. Its impact
was not prematurely discounted in the markets and therefore was a more effective
booster to market indexes, bringing with it the usual clamor of the collective pundits
that the worst was behind us, and "recovery" — How can one talk of recovery when the
full extent of the illness has not yet been fully diagnosed? — was on the way. Besides,
when a person of Greenspan's preeminence is so unnerved by market developments that
he finds himself publicly admitting that "I've never seen anything like this," when the
oracle himself starts to eat — gobble — humble pie, it behooves policymakers every-
where to hold their breath — and their appetite. Interest rate cuts in other countries —
Britain, Spain, Canada, China, Japan, and Ireland — provided a floor to cushion or
forestall global recession. But Germany continued to resist a cut, creating sufficient
uncertainty to keep the edge of volatility in the ascendant.
Greenspan's surprising remark is precisely the issue. Why had he been blind to what
had been so apparent to the rest of the world for some time? Some months ago econo-
mist Lester Thurow wrote,
Fear is rising and so is anger at do-nothing Americans . . . Having been at financial
and economic conferences in Latin America, Asia, and Europe in the past few
weeks, I find enormous anger at the entire United States. The rest of the world
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believes that an enormous economic hurricane is building up its strength and that
the captain of the ship, the ship's senior officers, and those who ride in first class
aren't paying attention to the dangers that are developing . . . They feel we are just
not focused on the dangers that are about to strike inland and lay waste the global
economy. 30
This, of course, is why Alan Greenspan's first quarter of a percentage point cut in
interest rates was greeted so negatively in the world capital markets, and why he had to
make an emergency second cut just two weeks later, and why he had to promise that he
was thinking of yet a third cut in the not-too-distant future.
To the rest of the world, that trivial first cut first looked as though Greenspan did not
know what was going on. The economic hurricane was about to arrive, and he, as the
leader of the world's central bank of last resort, was not willing to signal with a big
interest rate cut that, if necessary, he would provide the world with the liquidity the
world's markets needed to avoid a disaster. He did not seem to understand that issues
are no longer those of fine-tuning inflation but avoiding a global meltdown.
Thurow concludes,
When fear takes over in the financial markets, they fall apart very rapidly. Fears are
now growing like mushrooms. How big will the {worldwide] bank losses be? How
many more huge losses like those at Long-term Capital Investment will suddenly
appear? How many more countries like Russia and Malaysia are simply going to let
their companies violate [the pledges] they have signed and not force them to repay
legitimate debts? What happens if the stock market goes down and Americans begin
to cut back on their spending? What happens if Japan fails to continue to deal with
its problems? Rational or irrational, fear is clearly on the rise. 31
And imagine the fear if Brazil's much touted bailout becomes seriously derailed.
The signs that something is clearly out of kilter are everywhere. Policymakers make
statements as though hermetically sealed from each other. In the world's respected
financial organs legends like "US begins to catch a cold," 32 "China crisis," 33 "A world in
the woods," 34 "currency vacuum: gaping hole at the centre of the G7's plan to prevent
recurrence of the recent financial crisis,"35 "Turmoil hits US consumer confidence,"36
"Global bulls suffer crisis of confidence,"37 "Russia's bleak future,"38 "US consumers
score negative savings rates," 39 "Ominous symptoms of recession are apparent,"40 "Yen
depositrates fall to below zero," 41 "Chancellor paints gloomy world picture,"42 and on
the same page of The New York Times, "Greenspan Sees Calming of Markets" and
"Growth in Jobs Slowed Sharply Last Month,"43 "Chinese Investment Trust Defaults on
Bond Payments, Stirring Fear;"44 "Fears over Brazil roll-over," 45 follow each other
helter-skelter and the United States continues its roller-coaster ride on the markets, sure
that "God's in his heaven — All's right with the world."
Globalization is here to stay, Thabo Mbeki somberly informed the Non-Aligned
Summit. The crisis South Africa faced, indeed that they all were facing, was not of their
own making; rather it was a case of their being caught in the fallout following the col-
lapse of the Asian markets. "The stark reality," Mbeki concluded, "is that the power to
influence markets lies exclusively in the hands of those who dominate those markets,
which we, even collectively, do not."46
In October 1998, the glitterati of the financial world gathered in Washington, D.C.,
at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to dis-
cuss what was now being routinely described as the worst financial crisis to engulf the
world economy in fifty years. What lent gravitas to the occasion was the fact that the
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crisis they had gathered to discuss was never supposed to happen. Hadn't the integration
of global capital markets, the sophistication of the instruments that allowed for risk
diversification management, disclosure requirements, financial regulation and supervi-
sion, the omnipresence of rating agencies, the plethora of complex risk models, real-
time transactions, and instantaneous communications prevented the kind of collapse
that was gathering speed as they pondered the question: What had gone wrong?
Great minds knitted their brows and looked for fairy-tale remedies. But there were
none. In symposiums, workshops, plenary sessions, and one-on-ones, the mighty and
the not-so-mighty clustered together, applying their collective wisdom to unraveling the
monetary mess that was causing financial gyrations in world markets and threatening
economic chaos. It was if the free market had gotten away from them, had discovered
that its power was unbounded, that the unfettered movement of rapacious capital, as it
zigzagged from market to market and from markets to havens of shelter, could devour
whole economies, yet find its appetite still insatiable, searching in apoplectic fits and
starts for the carcasses of other bankrupt countries.
"This year, as currencies and bourses have crashed and people in the more damaged
economies have taken to the streets," writes Paul Bell, "the moral and theoretical pen-
dulum of political economics has begun to swing away from the neo-liberalism pre-
scriptions of the Thatcher/Reagan era, and back toward the social democratic construct
that was displaced by Thatcherism and is being reasserted now under a new neo-
Keynesian rubric of 'people- centered' development."47
In Asia state driven capitalism had long been held up to other emerging economies
(not least South Africa) as the best available model of rapid growth and poverty
reduction. But the crisis first exposed in the world in Thailand and South Korea a
year ago is discovered now to be long in the making as was the mythology of the
myth of their success. While the Asian economies were growing at 6-8 percent a
year, who cared that the chaebols were overprotected, or cronies overrewarded, or
financial institutions under regulated and increasingly reliant on short-term invest-
ment, or profits directed away from R&D into the overheated property markets of
those countries?48
Part Two
In Helsinki, Finland, on January 7, 1998, Joseph Stiglitz, senior vice president and chief
economist of the World Bank, delivered the 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, More Instru-
ments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus. This was, of
course, months before the full dimensions of the Asian crisis had brought a wave of
devaluations in its wake, before the full impact of "Asian contagion" had made itself
felt, before the collapse of the Japanese banking system, before many currencies went
into free fall, their economies littered with the detritus of economic collapse.
In the course of his remarks, he offered the following "world view," a glance, as it
were, into "new world thinking," or a thinking man's guide to how to put the brakes on
a free-market capitalism about to go berserk, an ax murderer abroad in a kindergarten.
His thoughts:
• The Washington consensus held that good economic performance
required liberalized trade, macroeconomic stability, and getting prices
right. Once the government dealt with these issues — essentially, once
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the government "got out of the way" — private markets would allocate
resources efficiently and generate robust growth. But the policies
advanced by the Washington consensus were not complete, and they
were sometimes misguided.
An admission that the mandarins of Washington, D.C., might on occasion screw it up?
A dent in the aura of infallibility?
• Making markets work requires more than just low inflation; it requires,
inter alia, sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies
to facilitate the transfer of technology and to encourage transparency.
• The Bank's understanding of the instruments to promote well-function-
ing markets had improved. They had broadened the objectives of
development to include other goals, such as sustainable development,
egalitarian development, and democratic development.
What, might we timidly ask, did the Bank consider to be the "objectives of develop-
ment" before lightning struck on the road to Damascus?
• Since the financial crisis the East Asian economies had been widely
condemned for their misguided economic policies, which were seen as
responsible for the mess in which those economies found themselves.
Some ideologues had taken advantage of the current problems in East
Asia to suggest that the system of active state intervention is the root of
the problem. They kept pointing to the government-directed loans and
the cozy relations between the government and the large chaebol in the
Republic of Korea. In doing so, they overlooked the successes of the
past three decades, to which the government, despite occasional
mistakes, had certainly contributed. These achievements, which in-
cluded not only large increases in per capita GDP but also increases in
life expectancy, the extension of education, and a dramatic reduction in
poverty, were real and would prove more lasting than the current
financial turmoil.
And this was only January 1998. What would these "ideologues" be saying in January-
1999, as the Republic of Korea remained mired in recession, and the chaebols re-
mained as resistant to restructuring as they did a year ago?
• The heart of the current problem, at least in East Asia, in most cases is
not that government has done too much in every area but that it has
done too little in some areas. In Thailand the problem was not that the
government directed investments into real estate; it was that government
regulators failed to halt it. Similarly, the Republic of Korea suffered
from problems including overlending to companies with excessively
high leverage and weak corporate governance. The fault is not that the
government misdirected credit — the fact that the current turmoil was
precipitated by loans by so many U.S., European, and Japanese banks
suggests that market entities also may have seriously misdirected credit.
Instead, the problem was the government's lack of action, the fact that
the government underestimated the importance of financial regulation
and corporate governance.
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• The current crisis in East Asia is not a refutation of the East Asian
miracle. The basic facts remain: no other region in the world has ever
had incomes rise so dramatically and seen so many people move out of
poverty in such a short time.
• East Asian governments, for instance, were running budget surpluses;
inflation was low and, before the devaluations, was falling. The origins
of the current financial crises lay elsewhere and their solutions would
not be found in the Washington consensus.
• The focus on inflation had detracted attention from other major sources
of macroinstability, namely, weak financial sectors. In focusing on
trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, policymakers
ignored other important ingredients, most notably competition, that are
required to make an effective market economy and which may be at
least as important as the standard economic prescriptions in determin-
ing long-term economic success.
• Other essential ingredients were also left out or underemphasized by the
Washington consensus. One, education, had been widely recognized
within the development community; another, improvement of technol-
ogy, had not received the attention it deserved.
• The success of the Washington consensus as an intellectual doctrine
rested on its simplicity: its policy recommendations could be adminis-
tered by economists using little more than simple accounting frame-
works. A few economic indicators — inflation, money supply growth,
interest rates, budget and trade deficits — could serve as the basis for a
set of policy recommendations. Indeed, in some cases economists
would fly into a country, look at and attempt to verify these data, and
make macroeconomic recommendations for policy reforms all in the
space of a couple of weeks.
Who are these people??
• There are no easy-to-read thermometers of the economy's health, and
worse still, there may be trade-offs in which economists, especially
outside economists, should limit their role to describing consequences
of alternative policies. The political process may actually have an
important say in the choices of economic direction. Economic policy
may not be just a matter for technical experts!
Poor nations have to put up with the clap-trap of these "outside" economists for de-
cades, and worse yet, have had to eat their words, even when the words stuck in the
craw.
• The Washington consensus's messages in two core areas are at best
incomplete and at worst misguided. While macrostability is important,
for example, inflation is not always its most essential component. Trade
liberalization and privatization are key parts of sound macroeconomic
policies, but they are not ends in themselves. They are means to the end
of a less distorted, more competitive, more efficient marketplace and
must be complemented by effective regulation and competition policies.
How many countries in Africa, and underdeveloped parts of the Americas and Asia,
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have suffered the consequences of such insufferable hubris andfound themselves end-
lessly at the short end of the IMF stick? Andfor what?
• Controlling inflation. Probably the most important policy prescription
of the stabilization packages promoted by the Washington consensus
was controlling inflation. The argument for aggressive, preemptive
strikes against inflation is based on three premises. The most funda-
mental is that inflation is costly and should therefore be averted or
lowered. The second premise is that once inflation starts to rise it has a
tendency to accelerate out of control. This belief provides a strong
motivation for preemptive strikes against inflation, with the risk of an
increase in inflation being weighed far more heavily than the risk of
adverse effects on output and unemployment. The third premise is that
increases in inflation are very costly to reverse. This line of thought
implies that even if maintaining low unemployment were valued more
highly than maintaining low inflation, steps would still be taken to keep
inflation from increasing today in order to avoid having to induce large
recessions to bring the inflation rate down later on. All three of these
premises can be tested empirically.
• The evidence has shown only that high inflation is costly. When coun-
tries cross the threshold of 40 percent annual inflation, they fall into a
high-inflation/low-growth trap. Below that level, however, there is little
evidence that inflation is costly. High inflation is, on average, deleteri-
ous for growth. Recent research suggests that low levels of inflation
may even improve economic performance relative to what it would have
been with zero inflation. Controlling high- and medium-rate inflation
should be a fundamental policy priority, but pushing low inflation even
lower is not likely to significantly improve the functioning of markets.
What false gods have we been serving? Andfor whom?
• In 1995, more than half the countries in the developing world had
inflation rates of less than 15 percent a year. For these seventy-one
countries controlling inflation should not be an overarching priority.
Controlling inflation is probably an important component of stabiliza-
tion and reform in the twenty-five countries, almost all of them in
Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, with inflation
rates of more than 40 percent a year. The single-minded focus on
inflation may not only distort economic policies, preventing the
economy from living up to its full growth and output potentials, but
also lead to institutional arrangements that reduce economic flexibility
without gaining important growth benefits.
Yet, why this fixation with inflation? Why does it not drive the engine ofpolicy in the
developing countries, but in the developed ones? Has it become an election mantra,
trotted out by bankers and businesspeople who know better?
• Managing the budget deficit and the current account deficit. A second
component of macroeconomic stability has been reducing the size of
government, the budget deficit, and the current account deficit. Much
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evidence shows that sustained, large-budget deficits are deleterious to
economic performance.
• There is no simple formula for determining the optimum level of the
budget deficit. The optimum deficit, or the range of sustainable deficits,
depends on circumstances, including the cyclical state of the economy,
prospects for future growth, the uses of government spending, the depth
of financial markets, and the levels of national savings and national
investment.
So much for all those writ-in-stone deficit-to-GDP ratios.
• The optimal level of the current account deficit is difficult to determine.
Current account deficits occur when a country invests more than it
saves. They are neither inherently good nor inherently bad but depend,
on circumstances and especially on the uses to which the funds are put.
In many countries the rate of return on investment far exceeds the cost
of international capital. In these circumstances current account deficits
are sustainable.
• The form of the financing deficits matters. The advantage of foreign
direct investment is not just the capital and knowledge that it supplies,
but also the fact that it tends to be very stable. In contrast, Thailand's 8
percent current account deficit in 1996 was not only large but came in
the form of short-term, dollar-denominated debt that was used to
finance local-currency-denominated investment, often in excessive and
unproductive uses like real estate. More generally, short-term debt and
portfolio flows can bring the costs of high volatility without the ben-
efits of knowledge spillovers.
• Stabilizing output and promoting long-run growth. Ironically, macro-
economic stability, as conceived by the Washington consensus, typi-
cally downplays stabilizing output or unemployment. Minimizing or
avoiding major economic contractions should be one of the most
important goals of policy. In the short run, large-scale involuntary
unemployment-is clearly inefficient — in purely economic terms it
represents idle resources that could be used more productively. The
social and economic costs of these downturns can be devastating: lives
and families are disrupted, poverty increases, living standards decline,
and, in the worst cases, social and economic costs translate into politi-
cal and social turmoil.
If 40 percent of the employable population is unemployed and another 20 percent un-
deremployed, what impact does a "downturn" have on their lives? It's not the
economy, stupid, it's jobs, jobs, and more jobs until they ooze out of every pore of the
country 's being. Poor countries don 't have financial sectors, but they do have people.
• A growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has emphasized the
important microeconomic underpinnings of macroeconomic stability.
This literature emphasizes the importance of financial markets and
explains economic downturns through such mechanisms as credit
rationing and banking and firm failures.
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In the nineteenth century, most of the major economic downturns in industrial coun-
tries resulted from financial panics that were sometimes preceded by and invariably led
to precipitous declines in asset prices and widespread banking failures. In some coun-
tries improvement in regulation and supervision, the introduction of deposit insurance,
and the shaping of incentives for financial institutions reduced the incidence and sever-
ity of financial panics. But financial crises continue to occur, and there is some evi-
dence that they have become more frequent and more severe in recent years Even after
adjusting for inflation, the losses from the savings and loan debacle in the United States
were several times larger than the losses experienced in the Great Depression. Yet when
measured relative to GDP, this debacle would not make the list of the top twenty-five
international banking crises since the early 1980s.
• Banking crises have severe macroeconomic consequences, affecting
growth over the five following years. During the period 1975-1994,
growth edged up slightly in countries that did not experience banking
crises; countries with banking crises saw growth slow by 1.3 percentage
points in the five years following a crisis. Clearly, building robust
financial systems is a crucial part of promoting macroeconomic stabil-
ity.
• The importance of building robust financial systems goes beyond
simply averting economic crises. The financial system can be likened to
the "brain" of the economy. Financial markets serve a number of other
functions, including reducing risk, increasing liquidity, and conveying
information. All these functions are essential to both the growth of
capital and the increase in total factor productivity.
• Left to themselves, financial systems will not do a very good job of
performing these functions.
• The emphasis on "transparency" in recent discussions of East Asia
demonstrates the growing recognition of the importance of good
information for the effective functioning of markets. Capital markets, in
particular, require auditing standards accompanied by effective legal
systems to discourage fraud, provide investors with adequate informa-
tion about the firms' assets and liabilities, and protect minority share-
holders. But transparency by itself is not sufficient, in part because
information is inevitably imperfect. A sound legal framework combined
with regulation and oversight is necessary to mitigate these informa-
tional problems and foster the conditions for efficient financial markets.
• Regulation serves four purposes in successful financial markets:
maintaining safety and soundness (prudential regulation), promoting
competition, protecting consumers, and ensuring that underserved
groups have some access to capital. In many cases the pursuit of social
objectives, such as ensuring that minorities and poor communities
receive funds, as the United States' Community Reinvestment Act does,
or ensuring funds for mortgages, the essential mission of the govern-
ment-created Federal National Mortgage Association, can, if done well,
reinforce economic objectives. Similarly, protecting consumers is not
only good social policy, it also builds confidence that there is a "level
playing field" in economic markets. Without such confidence those
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markets will remain thin and ineffective.
• The World Bank and others have tried to create better banking systems.
But changing the system through institutional development, transforma-
tions in credit culture, and creation of regulatory structures that reduce
the likelihood of excessive risk taking has proved more intractable than
finding short-term solutions such as recapitalizing the banking system.
In the worst cases the temporary fixes may even have undermined
pressures for further reform. Since the fundamental problems were not
addressed, some countries have required assistance again and again.
Translation: The World Bank and other international and supranational financial insti-
tutions have been a large part of the problem of the global predicament they now so
grandiosely moralize about. Instead of becoming part of the solution, it was often more
convenient to become part of the problem.
• The key issue should not be liberalization or deregulation but construc-
tion of the regulatory framework that ensures an effective financial
system. In many countries this will require changing the regulatory
framework by eliminating regulations that serve only to restrict compe-
tition but accompanying these changes with increased regulations to
ensure competition and prudential behavior (and to ensure that banks
have appropriate incentives).
• Even when the design of the desired financial system is in place, care
will have to be exercised in the transition. Attempts to initiate overnight
deregulation, sometimes known as the "big bang," ignore the very
sensitive issues of sequencing. Thailand, for instance, used to have
restrictions on bank lending for real estate. In the process of liberaliza-
tion it got rid of these restrictions without establishing a more sophisti-
cated risk-based regulatory regime. The result, together with other
factors, was the large-scale misallocation of capital to fuel a real estate
bubble, an important factor in the financial crisis.
• It is important to recognize how difficult it is to establish a vibrant
financial sector. Even economies with sophisticated institutions, high
levels of transparency, and good corporate governance like the United
States and Sweden have faced serious problems with their financial
sectors. The challenges facing developing countries are far greater,
while the institutional base from which they start is far weaker.
• Without the appropriate legal framework, securities markets can simply
fail to perform their vital functions to the detriment of a country's long-
term economic growth. Laws are required to protect the interests of
shareholders, especially minority shareholders.
• The focus on the microeconomic, particularly the financial, underpin-
nings of the macroeconomy also has implications for responses to
currency turmoil. In particular, where currency turmoil is the conse-
quence of a failing financial sector, the conventional policy response to
rising interest rates may be counterproductive. Interest rate increases
can lead to substantial reductions in bank net worth, further exacerbat-
ing the banking crisis. Empirical studies by IMF and World Bank
economists have confirmed that interest rate rises tend to increase the
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probability of banking crises and that currency devaluations have no
significant effect.
This will be most reassuring to all those emerging markets, especially the likes of
South Africa, which held their breath while Alan Greenspan held his serve! Not a single
mention of the Federal Reserve Board?
• Advocates of high-interest-rate policies assert that such policies are
necessary to restore confidence in the economy and thus stop the
erosion of the currency's value. Halting the erosion of the currency, in
turn, is important both to restore the underlying strength of the
economy and to prevent a burst of inflation from the rise of the price of
imported goods. This prescription is based on assumptions about market
reactions — that is, what will restore confidence — and economic
fundamentals. Ultimately confidence and economic fundamentals are
inextricably intertwined. Are measures that weaken the economy,
especially the financial system, likely to restore confidence?
South Africa, are you listening?
• Macroeconomic policy needs to be expanded beyond a single-minded
focus on inflation and budget deficits; the set of policies that underlay
the Washington consensus are not sufficient for macroeconomic stabil-
ity or long-term development. Macroeconomic stability and long-term
development require sound financial markets. But the agenda for
creating sound financial markets should not confuse means with ends;
redesigning the regulatory system, not financial liberalization, should
be the issue.
• The fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the results that
establish the efficiency of a market economy, assume that both private
property and competitive markets exist in the economy. Many coun-
tries, especially developing and transition economies, lack both. Until
recently, however, emphasis was placed almost exclusively on creating
private property and liberalizing trade — trade liberalization being
confused with establishing competitive markets. Trade liberalization is
important, but we are unlikely to realize the full benefits of liberalizing
trade without creating a competitive economy.
• Facilitating privatization. State monopolies in certain industries have
stifled competition. But the emphasis on privatization over the past
decade has stemmed less from concern over lack of competition than
from a focus on profit incentives. In a sense, it was natural for the
Washington consensus to focus more on privatization than on competi-
tion. Not only were state enterprises inefficient, their losses contributed
to the government's budget deficit, adding to macroeconomic instabil-
ity. Privatization would kill two birds with one stone, simultaneously
improving economic efficiency and reducing fiscal deficits. The idea
was that if property rights could be created, the profit-maximizing
behavior of the owners would eliminate waste and inefficiency. At the
same time the sale of the enterprises would raise much needed revenue.
• Although most people would have preferred a more orderly restructuring
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and the establishment of an effective legal structure (covering contracts,
bankruptcy, corporate governance, and competition) prior to or at least
simultaneously with promulgations, no one knew how long the reform
window would stay open. At the time, privatizing quickly and compre-
hensively, then fixing the problems later on, seemed a reasonable
gamble. From today's vantage point, the advocates of privatization may
have overestimated the benefits of privatization and underestimated the
costs, particularly the political costs of the process itself and the
impediments it has posed to further reform. Taking that same gamble
today, with the benefit of seven more years of experience, would be
much less justified.
Many in the supranational financial institutions warned against hastily
privatizing without creating the needed institutional infrastructure,
including competitive markets and regulatory bodies. If, for instance,
competition is lacking, creating a private, unregulated monopoly will
likely result in even higher prices for consumers. And there is some
evidence that insulated from competition, private monopolies may
suffer from several forms of inefficiency and may not be highly innova-
tive. In other words, why push ahead with privatization without promot-
ing competition?
The Washington consensus is right — privatization is important. The
government needs to devote its scarce resources to areas the private
sector does not and is not likely to enter. It makes no sense for the
government to be running steel mills. But there are critical issues about
both the sequencing and the scope of privatization. Even when
privatization increases productive efficiency, it may be difficult to
ensure that broader public objectives are attained, even with regulation.
Should prisons, social services, or the making of atomic bombs (or the
central ingredient of atomic bombs, highly enriched uranium) be
privatized, as some in the United States have advocated? Where are the
boundaries? More private-sector activity can be introduced into public
activities (through contracting, for example, and incentive-based
mechanisms such as auctions). How effective are such mechanisms as
substitutes for outright privatization? These issues were not addressed
by the Washington consensus. One must balance between the competing
demands of private efficiency and public objectives.
For much of this century people have looked to government to spend
more and intervene more. Government spending as a share of GDP has
grown with these demands. The Washington consensus policies were
based on a rejection of the state's activist role and the promotion of a
minimalist, noninterventionist state. The unspoken premise is that
governments are worse than markets. Therefore the smaller the state the
better the state.
It is true that states are often involved in too many things, in an unfo-
cused manner. This lack of focus reduces efficiency; trying to get
government better focused on the fundamentals — economic policies,
basic education, health, roads, law and order, environmental protection
- is a vital step. But focusing on the fundamentals is not a recipe for
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minimalist government. The stale has an important role to play in
appropriate regulation, social protection, and welfare. The choice
should not be whether the state should be involved but how it gets
involved. Thus the central question should not be the size of the
government but the activities and methods of the government. Countries
with successful economies have governments that are involved in a
wide range of activities. In other words, the size of the state in the
economy is not the issue; the issue is the manner of its involvement.
More recently, there has been a growing recognition that the govern-
ment and private sector are much more intimately entwined. The
government should serve as a complement to markets, undertaking
actions that make markets work better and correcting market failures. In
some cases the government has proved to be an effective catalyst — its
actions have helped solve the problem of undersupply of (social)
innovation, for example. But once it has performed its catalytic role,
the state needs to withdraw.
There are two areas, among others, in which government can serve as an
important complement to markets — building human capital and
transferring technology.
Building human capital. The role of human capital in economic growth
has long been appreciated. The returns for an additional year of educa-
tion in the United States, for example, have been estimated at 5 to 15
percent. The rate of return is even higher in developing countries: 24
percent for primary education in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, and
an average of 23 percent for primary education in all low-income
countries. Growth accounting also attributes a substantial portion of
growth in developing countries to human capital accumulation. The
East Asian economies, for instance, emphasized the role of government
in providing universal education, which was a necessary part of their
transformation from agrarian to rapidly industrializing economies.
Left to itself, the market will tend not to provide adequate human
capital. It is very difficult to borrow against the prospects of future
earnings since human capital cannot be collateralized. These difficulties
are especially severe for poorer families. The government thus plays an
important role in providing public education, making education more
affordable, and enhancing access to funding.
Transferring technology. Studies of the returns for research and develop-
ment (R&D) in industrial countries have consistently found individual
returns of 20 to 30 percent and social returns of 50 percent or higher,
far exceeding the returns for education. Most studies attribute the
majority of per capita income growth to improvements in technical
change. Robert Solow's pioneering analysis attributed 87.5 percent of
the increase in output per man-hour between 1909 and 1949 to techni-
cal change. Another study provides strong evidence that per capita
income in the Republic of Korea in 1990 would have been only $2,041
(in 1985 international dollars) if it had relied solely on capital accumu-
lation, far lower than actual per capita income of $6,665. The differ-
ence comes from increasing the amount of output per unit of input,
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which is partly the result of improvements in technology.
• Left to itself, the market underprovides technology. Like investments in
education, investments in technology cannot be used as collateral.
Investments in R&D are also considerably riskier than other types of
investment, and there are much larger asymmetries of information that
can impede the effective workings of the market. Technology also has
enormous positive externalities that the market does not reward. Indeed,
in some respects, knowledge is like a classical public good. The bene-
fits to society of increased investment in technology far outweigh the
benefits to individual entrepreneurs. Without government action there
will be too little investment in the production and adoption of new
technology.
• For most countries, especially developing countries not at the techno-
logical frontier, the returns associated with facilitating the transfer of
technology are much higher than the returns from undertaking original
research and development. Policies to facilitate the transfer of technol-
ogy are thus one of the keys to development. One aspect of these
policies is investing in human capital, especially in tertiary education.
Funding of universities is justified not because it increases the human
capital of particular individuals but because of the major externalities
that come from enabling the economy to import ideas. Of course,
unemployment rates for university graduates are high in many develop-
ing countries, and many university graduates hold unproductive civil
service jobs. These countries have probably overemphasized liberal arts
education. In contrast, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China) have
narrowed the productivity gap with the leading industrial countries by
training scientists and engineers.
• Another policy that can promote the transfer of technology is foreign
direct investment. Singapore, for example, was able to assimilate
rapidly the knowledge that came from its large inflows of foreign direct
investment.
• Making government more effective. How can policies be designed that
increase the productivity of the economy? Again, ends must not be
confused with means. The elements stressed by the Washington consen-
sus may have been reasonable means for addressing the particular set of
problems confronting the Latin American economies in the 1980s, but
they may not be the only, or even the central, elements of policies
aimed at addressing problems in other circumstances.
In which case, one must reasonably ask, why are such policies still the practice rather
than the exception ? Why are they embarked upon by the IMF with such callous abandon
without consideration to the human costs involved?
• Part of the strategy for a more productive economy is ascertaining the
appropriate role for government, identifying, for instance, the ways in
which government can be a more effective complement to markets.
How can one make government more effective in accomplishing
whatever tasks it undertakes? The empirical evidence indicates that an
effective state is vital for development Using data from ninety-four
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countries over three decades, a seminal World Bank study shows that it
is not just economic policies and human capital but the quality of a
country's institutions that determine economic outcomes. Those
institutions in effect determine the environment within which markets
operate. A weak institutional environment allows greater arbitrariness
on the part of state agencies and public officials.
• Given very different starting points, unique histories, cultures, and
societal factors, how can a state become effective? Part of the answer is
that the state should match its role to its capability. What the govern-
ment does, and how it does it, should reflect the capabilities of the
government — and those of the private sector. Low-income countries
often have weaker markets and weaker government institutions. It is
especially important, therefore, that they focus on how they can most
effectively complement markets.
In short, especially in newly emerging democracies, governments must take account of
the capacity of the government to effect change. But there is another dimension to
change more fundamental than the capacity of the government, the capacity of the soci-
ety itself to absorb change. But there is also a suggestion here that in low-income coun-
tries with both weak government institutions and weak markets, the government should
serve as the "agent" of the market rather than the other way around. How does the
market sit with democratic governance?
• Capability is not destiny. States can improve their capabilities by
reinvig orating their institutions. This means not only building adminis-
trative or technical capacity but instituting rules and norms that provide
officials with incentives to act in the collective interest while restrain-
ing arbitrary action and corruption. An independent judiciary, institu-
tional checks and balances through the separation of powers, and
effective watchdogs can all restrain arbitrary state action and corruption.
Competitive wages for civil servants can attract more talented people
and increase professionalism and integrity.
In theory, not just laudable but more of the stuff of the "right thing." But many of the
countries whose initial steps to transition, some successful, some not, we examine in
this issue have no institutions to reinvigorate. Corruption is not only endemic but cul-
turally ingrained, a necessary habit for survival. Effective law enforcement agencies are
nonexistent or part of the law enforcement problem. The judiciary is for all legal pur-
poses extant. Institutional checks presuppose institutions exist.
• Governments are more effective when they respond to the needs and
interests of their citizens, at the same time giving them a sense of
ownership and stake in the policies.
Which governments, new to the trappings ofpower, do not begin with such "people-
centered" principles? Which soon find the process of consultation and consensus build-
ing time-consuming, inefficient, and an obstacle to getting things done? When do the
sheer burdens of trying to balance so many interests against so few resources sap the
limited energy to provide that sense of ownership when, again, no institutional struc-
tures are in place to accommodate them and when the resources and capacity to build
these institutions are woefully absent?
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• Broadening the goals of development. The Washington consensus
advocated use of a small set of instruments (including macroeconomic
stability, liberalized trade, and privatization) to achieve a relatively
narrow goal (economic growth). The post-Washington consensus
recognizes both that a broader set of instruments is necessary and that
the goals are also much broader. We seek increases in living standards,
including improved health and education, not just increases in mea-
sured GDP. We seek sustainable development, which includes preserv-
ing natural resources and maintaining a healthy environment. We seek
equitable development, which ensures that all groups in society, not just
those at the top, enjoy the fruits of development. And we seek demo-
cratic development, in which citizens participate in a variety of ways in
making the decisions that affect their lives.
• Knowledge has not kept pace with this proliferation of goals. We are
only beginning to understand the relationship between democratization,
inequality, environmental protection, and growth. What we do know
holds out the promise of developing complementary strategies that can
move us toward meeting all of these objectives. But we must recognize
that not all policies will contribute to all objectives. Many policies
entail trade-offs. It is important to recognize these trade-offs and make
choices about priorities. Concentrating solely on win-win policies can
lead policymakers to ignore important decisions about win-lose policies.
• The World Bank's East Asian miracle project was a significant turning
point in the discussion. It showed that the stunning success of the East
Asian economies depended on much more than just macroeconomic
stability or privatization. Without a robust financial system, which the
government plays a huge role in creating and maintaining, it is difficult
to mobilize savings or allocate capital efficiently. Unless the economy
is competitive, the benefits of free trade and privatization will be
dissipated in rent seeking, not directed toward wealth creation. And if
public investment in human capital and technology transfers is insuffi-
cient, the market will not fill the gap.
One principle that emerges from the ideas he discusses, Stiglitz concludes, is that
whatever the new consensus is, it cannot be based on Washington. If policies are to be
sustainable, developing countries must claim ownership of them. It is relatively easier
to monitor and set conditions for inflation rates and current account balances. Doing the
same for financial sector regulation or competition policy is neither feasible nor desir-
able.
The proof of the pudding, et cetera.
A second principle of the emerging consensus is that a greater degree of humility is
called for, acknowledgment of the fact that we do not have all the answers. Continued
research and discussion, not just between the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund but throughout the world, is essential if we are to better understand how to
achieve our many goals.
Amen.
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For the record: In the course of his remarks, Stiglitz mentioned the word democracy
three times, the word egalitarian twice, unemployment once, direct foreign investment
once. The key variables are institutional: the overriding importance of a "robust" finan-
cial sector, a strong and regulated banking system, a responsive institutional capacity,
building institutional capacity and restraints on arbitrary action and corruption, the
promotion of competition, a balanced approach to privatization, an effective state, the
primacy of the market. In his analysis, institution building would appear to take prece-
dence over governance strengthening.
Part Three
In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam argues that the successful evolution of
civic traditions is what makes democracy work. He analyzes what happened in Italy
when the Italian government transferred almost 80 percent of the national budget from
the central government to the regional and local governments. He concludes that the
only really certain indicator of the potential effectiveness of government at a given level
is the number of clubs, social organizations, unions, and the like per thousand heads of
population. In short, what counts is the density of the institutional fabric within a com-
munity. The more dense the institutional fabric per unit of population, the more effec-
tive the governmental unit that has jurisdiction over the people in the area in question.
According to Putnam, well-developed institutional fabric is itself the manifestation
of value systems and horizontal relationships within the community in question. Mutual
trust, respect, and cooperation between people within a community result in societal
structures and arrangements that facilitate economic activity and good government and
"empower" the individual; that is, economic development does not generate a strong
social fabric; rather it would appear that a strong social fabric is a precursor for eco-
nomic development. Unwittingly, we may have been putting the cart before the horse.
Such "healthy" social structures, he points out, have to be distinguished from other
structures, vertical structures in which individuals rely not so much on themselves but
on "authorities" above them and on cheating or using "the system" to their own advan-
tage. This type of arrangement invariably results in patronage, clientism, dependency,
and inefficiency — poor governance and social fragmentation. Putnam writes,
In areas of Italy long subjected to autocratic rule, the absence of a community sense
resulted from a habit of insubordination learned from centuries of oppression.
Even the nobles had become accustomed to obstruction, and thought that gov-
ernments could be fairly cheated without moral obliquity so long as the cheating
was successful . . .
Insead of recognising that taxes had to be paid, the attitude was rather that if one
group had discovered a profitable evasion, then the other groups had better look to
their own interests.
Each province, each class, each industry thus endeavoured to gain at the expense
of the community.49
If one were to extrapolate Putnam's findings to any of the countries included in this
review, whether South Africa, the Philippines, Mozambique, Nigeria, Slovakia, El Sal-
vador, Angola, Kenya, Nicaragua, Oromia, Cambodia, and even Israel, and any country
emerging from a postconflict situation, the conclusions might be strikingly similar.
Emerging from hundreds of years of colonialism, oppression, ethnic or ideological
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strife, poverty-stricken, corrupt, with great disparities in wealth, with an under-
abundance of resources, burdened by debt, they find themselves without the kind of
institutional framework of which Putnam speaks. They lack a robust social fabric, in
many cases a social fabric itself.
As they inch their ways into the twenty-first century, often blindly following paths of
transition to forms of democracy that may be beyond their capacity to implement, buf-
feted by an uncaring world, fodder in a global economy, their concepts of sovereignty
and national independence largely outmoded and illusory, their capacity to be "masters
of their own fates" a thing of the past, their subjectivity to external constraints in almost
every sphere of action further diminishing what they themselves can accomplish, at the
caprice of whatever capital flows may arbitrarily, or perhaps more accurately, unwit-
tingly, flatten their tin huts, their place in the pecking order of a more "genteel" global
capitalism dependent on their obsequiousness in the face of its demands, they may
wonder what this thing "democracy" is all about, and whether anyone ever heard of a
level playing field, the supposed precursor for a more humane and equal world.
Or will the lesson of the next millennium be "To the victor belongs [all] the
spoils"? ^8»
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